La Raza (Des)Unida: Blackness, Whiteness, and Latino Racial Politics Beyond Panethnicity

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3 November 2026

Abstract

Existing work has focused on the role of panethnic identities in structuring Latino political attitudes, but this literature leaves us ill-equipped to comprehend substantial intra-Latino disagreement on racialized policies like immigration. I argue that Latinos' racial attachments to groups beyond panethnicity can help explain these instances of intragroup difference. In addition to maintaining panethnic or national origin identities, many Latinos strongly identify as White or Black. These identities reflect meaningful commitments to upholding dominant Whiteness or contesting anti-Blackness. Because negative racial stereotypes around racialized "illegality" threaten claims to Whiteness, strong White-identifying Latinos distance themselves from undocumented Latino immigrants. Two original surveys show that White identities among Latinos are strongly related to Trump support and negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, while Black identities predict liberal Black-centered policy attitudes. Findings demonstrate that Black and White identities among Latinos rival or surpass panethnic identities in explaining variation in racialized political attitudes.

Keywords: Political behavior; race and ethnicity; Latina/o/x politics; identity

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I thank Lauren Davenport, Hakeem Jefferson, Justin Grimmer, Vicky Fouka, Aliya Saperstein, Roberto Carlos, Angie Ocampo-Roland, Jair Moreira, Ángel Saavedra Cisneros, Alexander Agadjanian, Sachin Allums, participants at the 2024 and 2025 APSA annual meetings, participants at the 2025 MPSA annual meeting, and participants at the Ideas First Stanford Workshop for helpful comments. I am grateful for funding from the Stanford Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, the Stanford Enhancing Diversity in Graduate Education Fellowship, and the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship.

In October 2022, a leaked recording revealed several Latino[1] members of the Los Angeles City Council making racist comments during a private meeting. The City Council President, Nury Martinez, made anti-Black and anti-Indigenous remarks targeted toward Mexican immigrants from Oaxaca, sparking days of protests by many Indigenous, Oaxacan Angelenos (Dillingham 2022). This episode is noteworthy because of the broad expectation that Latinos would be unified in their opposition to racial hierarchy. Instead, however, the event brought long-standing divisions within Latino politics to the surface. Latino individuals – widely recognized as occupying a distinct racial category in the U.S. – frequently disagree on racialized issues which implicate the group. In fact, 37 percent of Californian Latinos view undocumented immigrants as a major burden (DiCamillo 2024), and 45 percent of Latinos in a 2021 Pew survey stated that it was "important" or "very important" to "increase deportations of immigrants currently in the country illegally" (Krogstad and Lopez 2021).

Although Latino conservatism should hardly be surprising (Cadava 2020; Cadena 2025), these instances complicate notions of Latinos as a unified racial group. The literature in Latino politics – while carefully examining panethnic identities and mobilization in response to a legacy of racialization and violence (Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2019; Gutierrez et al. 2019; Zepeda-Millán 2017) – has paid less attention to the distinct racial attachments Latinos may hold beyond panethnicity or national origin. This is despite the persistence of race and color-based inequalities in the Americas (Clealand 2022; Dávila, Mora, and Stockly 2011; Telles 2014) and the complex historical relationship of U.S. Latino political movements to Whiteness and Blackness (Gómez 2018; Haney López 2003; Kaplowitz 2005). By centering a Latino politics of race beyond panethnicity, the current research extends a growing body of work complicating accounts of panethnic solidarity on racialized issues like immigration (García Bedolla 2005; Hickel et al. 2021; Krupnikov and Piston 2016).

I argue that we must look beyond panethnic identities to understand heterogeneity in Lati-

[1]For consistency, I use "Latino" to encompass individuals in the U.S. of both Hispanic and Latino descent. "Latinidad" is the Spanish noun for being Latino, comparable to Blackness or Whiteness.

nos' attitudes on racialized political issues. Latinos in the U.S. navigate a racial hierarchy that continues to be defined by central poles of Blackness and Whiteness. As such, many Latinos develop strong Black and White identities that reflect meaningful self-understandings and shared political orientations with Black and White people. In particular, I contend that strong White identities among Latinos reflect a desire to affiliate with the dominant racial group in U.S. politics, while strong Black identities reflect an awareness of racial inequality and rejection of anti-Blackness. These identities coexist alongside, rather than replace, panethnic and national origin identities.

Bridging historical accounts of Latino activism with the literature on stigma and identity threats in politics (García Bedolla 2005; Jefferson 2023; Pérez 2015), I develop a theory of how Latinos navigate Black and White identities alongside the broader stigmatization of Latinidad. Ethnoracial identities emerge not in isolation but in relation to one another (Omi and Winant 1994). Latinos who identify as White concurrently grapple with negative stereotypes of Latinos as inferior, perpetual outsiders (Menjívar 2021; Zou and Cheryan 2017). These stereotypes are especially tied to undocumented Latinos, whose racialization as "illegals" threatens marginal Latino claims to Whiteness. As such, White identities among Latinos are closely intertwined with conservative attitudes on immigration and, in particular, unfavorable attitudes toward undocumented immigrants. Strong Black-identifying Latinos, meanwhile, confront marginalization as both Black and Latino and subsequently hold pro-Black policy attitudes.

To test these expectations, I draw upon two original surveys of Latinos (N=1,488 and N=577) containing novel measures of White and Black identities. I demonstrate the validity of three distinct measures of subjective racial attachments to Blackness and Whiteness among Latinos associated with – but not fully explained by – racial self-classification, partisanship, and socioeconomic status. Across the measures, stronger White identities are closely tied to support for Trump and negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants and explain similar or greater amounts of variation than panethnic or national origin identities. Strong Black identities predict liberal attitudes on issues that have been historically linked to Black people in the U.S., including affirmative action, welfare, and the death penalty. Notably, once accounting for varying levels of racial attachment, self-classifications on their own are weakly and

insignificantly related to Latino political attitudes.

This work makes several contributions. First, it complicates foundational accounts of Latino political mobilization that emphasize panethnic and national origin identities as the primary bases of Latino political behavior (Barreto 2007). Instead, my findings show that members of the same panethnic or national origin category may hold distinct racial identities such as Black or White. These identities often explain more variation in attitudes toward undocumented immigration and welfare than panethnic or national origin identities, contributing to a growing literature seeking to understand intra-Latino disagreement on racialized issues.

Second, this paper offers new ways of conceptualizing and measuring racial and ethnic identities when group boundaries are not fixed. It demonstrates that Latinos may meaningfully identify with Whiteness or Blackness – seeing themselves as connected to White or Black people or sharing feelings, beliefs, and interests – even when their belonging in these categories is uncertain or conditional. Finally, whereas much of the literature assumes that individuals hold a single, fixed racial identity, the present work shows that individuals actively contest the boundaries of racial group membership through politics and adopt multiple, overlapping identities. These findings may be useful for comprehending the political attitudes of other groups across racially and ethnically diverse societies where group boundaries are increasingly blurred.

Panethnic and National Origin Identities in U.S. Politics

Scholarship on contemporary Latino politics has predominantly focused on panethnic and national origin identities in understanding Latino political behavior. Acknowledging legacies of racialization, and situated within a wider body of scholarship on how non-White individuals develop politicized identities (Dawson 1994), this work has established the importance of panethnic identities in motivating Latino turnout, Democratic Party identification, and shaping attitudes on issues like bilingual education (Barreto 2007; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016). Scholars have used panethnicity as a key lens to explain how Latinos mobilize against hostile immigration environments, which themselves reinforce Latino identity across generations (Jiménez 2008; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; White 2016).

Zepeda-Millán (2017), for example, explores how the highly restrictive Sensenbrenner Bill generated strong opposition and mass protests by millions of Latinos, who saw it as an attack on all Latinos regardless of citizenship status. While national origin plays a role, with Mexican Americans – the specific targets of much anti-immigrant rhetoric – being uniquely mobilized (Garcia-Rios et al. 2019), opposition to xenophobic rhetoric cuts across national origin (Gutierrez et al. 2019). Barreto (2007) aptly summarizes this view, writing: "Without regard to nativity, immigrant status, generation, or age, Latinos of all backgrounds participated in the immigration rallies in 2006. The implication was clear: shared ethnicity was an overwhelming mobilizing force for many in the Latino community" (438).

Complicating notions of Latinos as a unified bloc, other work has documented how Latinos may instead distance themselves from members of the panethnic group in response to stigma (García Bedolla 2005; Pérez 2015). Latinidad is stigmatized in the U.S. through assumptions of foreignness, inferiority, and – in particular – through the racialization of "illegality," in which Latinos are tied to negative stereotypes of undocumented immigrants as undeserving criminals (Flores and Schachter 2018; Menjívar 2021; Zou and Cheryan 2017). In her seminal work, García Bedolla (2005) shows how native-born, English-speaking Latinos often disassociate themselves from immigrant, Spanish monolinguals, whom they perceive to challenge group mobility. Many such Latinos draw a distinction between "legal" and "illegal" immigrants and subsequently support propositions that seek to eliminate government services for undocumented immigrants.

Drawing upon these insights, more recent quantitative accounts have explored the distinct ways Latinos navigate identity threats and how these strategies map onto political attitudes. In response to messages that impugn undocumented immigrants, weak panethnic identifiers become less supportive of pro-Latino policies (Pérez 2015). When Latinos' status as Americans is threatened, some Latinos prioritize an American (over Latino) identity, which in turn explains anti-Black attitudes and restrictive immigration attitudes (Hickel et al. 2021; Pérez, Robertson, and Vicuña 2023). This scholarship deepens our comprehension of Latino political diversity, but panethnicity remains the dominant paradigm in this work.

Latinos and the Black-White Color Line

Historical accounts, however, suggest that Latinos frequently positioned themselves along the Black-White color line. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Mexicans navigated blurry racial boundaries, being seen "simultaneously as White and non-White" (Fox and Guglielmo 2012, 367).[2] Panethnicity is a more recent construction, dating to the mid-to-late 20th century. "Latino" emerged as a panethnic category through the negotiation of Latino activists seeking representation with ethnic entrepreneurs and Census officials, appearing on the Census for the first time in 1980. Before this, Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Americans – who were, at the time, highly regional populations – did not see themselves as sharing an identity (Mora 2014).

Instead, early Latino activists and elites strategically employed legal Whiteness, a status upheld by several courts in the 19th century and rooted in the citizenship rights granted to Mexicans under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Haney López 2006; Menchaca 2001). Gómez (2018) describes how Mexican elites in early New Mexico contended with their "off-White" status by supporting enslavement and the disenfranchisement of Pueblo Indians. Their position rested on a reverse one-drop rule: "for blacks, one drop of African ancestry justified legal disabilities, while for Mexicans, one drop of Spanish ancestry at times conferred legal rights" (12). The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the oldest Latino civil rights organization in the U.S., adopted an assimilationist approach and emphasized Mexican American Whiteness (Haney López 2003). In his history of the organization, Kaplowitz (2005) shows how LULAC leaders supported Operation Wetback – a program targeting undocumented Mexican immigrants – because they "threatened the very society LULAC leaders sought to create, one where all Mexican Americans would share a faith in the American political and economic system, work hard as law-abiding citizens, and achieve success in the American economic and

[2]For example, while Mexicans served in all-White military units, they were often subject to segregated schools and facilities. Their racialization varied even within the same locality, where "the same Mexican individual might be judged White by the naturalization examiner but non-White by the school official. Or White by the standards of the marriage clerk but non-White by the standards of the bus driver" (Fox and Guglielmo 2012, 367).

political mainstream" (50).

It was not until the Chicano and Young Lords movements of the mid-to-late 20th century that Latino activists rejected Whiteness and aligned themselves with the Black struggle for civil rights. In contrast to LULAC's approach, the youth-led Chicano movement saw itself as part of a "Brown race" and took inspiration from the Black Power movement (Haney López 2003).[3] La Raza Unida Party – the namesake of the current work, literally meaning "The United Race" Party – emerged in Texas and California in the 1970s in response to Mexican marginalization within the Democratic Party and exemplified an emerging Latino racial consciousness (García 1989). Beyond developing a Puerto Rican and Latino racial consciousness, the Young Lords explicitly challenged anti-Blackness within Puerto Rican communities and drew a quarter of their membership from among African Americans (Fernández 2020). These historical accounts suggest that Black and White identities, understood in relation to panethnicity and national origin, have closely shaped Latino politics.[4]

Since the peak of these movements around 1970, the Latino population in the U.S. has grown from 5 percent to nearly 20 percent in 2020. Yet long-standing race and color inequalities in Latin America – reproduced by Latino immigrants (Roth 2012; Zamora 2022) – reinforce the historical salience of the Black-White color line for Latinos. Despite widespread mixing, racial differences structure socioeconomic outcomes and opportunity in Latin America and among U.S. Latinos (Telles 2014; Dávila et al. 2011; Monk 2016). Whiteness remains a privileged identity in Latin America (Sue 2014), whereas Black and Indigenous movements in the region have brought increased salience to these identities (Paschel 2016; Flores, Vignau Loría, and Martínez Casas 2023).

Quantitative assessments in American politics have begun to explore the political conse-

[3]Importantly, and in contrast to the Young Lords, the Chicano movement – while modeling itself after Black Power – distanced itself from Blackness. As Haney López (2003) writes, "Though Chicanos did not want to be White, neither did they want to be black" (212).

[4]In a similar vein, Gosin (2019) demonstrates how Cuban American elites in Miami strategically employed Whiteness in the 1980s and 1990s.

quences of these distinct identities (Cuevas-Molina 2023; Castro-Irizarry 2026; Stokes-Brown 2006). However, this work employs Latino racial self-classifications on Census-style questions, which may not fully capture Latinos' racial self-understandings or attachments (Dowling 2015; Roth 2016).[5] By contrast, employing a measure akin to that of White identity among non-Latinos, Filindra and Kolbe (2022) show how White identities are meaningful for many Latinos and present evidence that they predict opposition to welfare (but not immigration). The present research integrates and extends these findings in a theory of how Latinos negotiate politics through Black and White identities. Notably, I connect these identities to key contemporary divides on immigration and Black-centered issues like affirmative action.

Theory and Argument

Latinos have origins in diverse societies which share histories of colonization, enslavement, and immigration. In the U.S., Latinos have contested their marginalization or pursued upward racial mobility via Blackness and Whiteness. Today, an increasingly hostile and xenophobic political context devalues Latinidad, particularly in relation to "illegality." I argue that attachments to Whiteness and Blackness are central to how many Latinos engage with and understand contemporary politics. Strong Black and White identities among Latinos encompass specific worldviews that either challenge anti-Blackness or uphold dominant Whiteness and entail a set of racialized policy attitudes as a result.

Racial identity is an individual's internal sense of membership and subjective attachment to racial categories (Tajfel and Turner 1986). I argue that many Latinos fit both of these dimensions of identity: seeing themselves as members of Black and White racial groups *and* having a strong psychological attachment to Blackness and Whiteness. Consistent with the broader

[5]Additionally, studies using measures of White or Black self-classification on the Cooperative Election Study and Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (e.g., Cuevas-Molina 2023; Castro-Irizarry 2026) – which employ a Census-style question with a Latino option – are unable to distinguish between respondents with two Latino parents or one non-Latino parent. We might expect that respondents with a non-Latino White parent, for example, would hold more racially conservative attitudes (Jardina 2019), calling into question the extent to which these respondents drive the results.

literature on identity politics, perceived group membership alone does not necessarily reflect the personal significance of the group or investment in its standing (Huddy 2001; Lee 2008; McClain et al. 2009). Rather, it is the strength of one's attachment that encourages individuals to evaluate political issues in relation to the group's perceived interests. Accordingly, Latinos who hold stronger subjective attachments to Blackness and Whiteness – beyond merely seeing themselves as Black or White – will adopt political worldviews that they perceive as advancing the group's status.

I treat "Latino" as an explicitly racial identity that can overlap with White or Black identification without replacing panethnic or national origin identities.[6] Although Black and White-identifying Latinos may not necessarily be accepted as such by outsiders, I focus on self-identities because they reflect meaningful contestations around racial boundaries and commitments to distinct racial projects (Omi and Winant 1994). Acceptance by the dominant group of non-Latino White people is not guaranteed, even among Latinos who are perceived by others as White (Abascal 2020; Schachter, Flores, and Maghbouleh 2021). Other Latinos who are perceived as White by others may not actually see themselves as such, underscoring the importance of focusing on self-identification.

In the context of contested or blurred boundaries, racial attachments may extend beyond the groups to which one sees oneself as fully belonging. Latinos who see themselves primarily as Latino or through their national origin identity (e.g., Mexican American) may identify with White or Black people even when they do not see themselves as full members of those categories, or when their sense of membership is uncertain. This identification goes beyond favorable affect or evaluation, involving perceived common interests and a sense that the group's standing bears on one's own position and prospects. For such Latinos, skin color, socioeconomic status, and immigrant generation may shape how personally significant Blackness and

[6]This formulation treats Latinidad as a racial category, one which is assumed to share a set of physical characteristics like Brown skin and straight hair despite within group variation (Cobas, Duany, and Feagin 2009). It acknowledges the conceptual difficulty in attempts to distinguish between race and ethnicity (Wimmer 2008).

Whiteness are to one's self-esteem or status.[7]

Consistent with historical accounts of Latino elites (Haney López 2003; Kaplowitz 2005), White identities emerge alongside the stigmatization of Latinidad. As such, Whiteness is specifically bound up with the repudiation of negatively stereotyped in-group members who threaten upward racial mobility. Undocumented Latinos – who have long faced stigma – represent one of the most negatively stereotyped Latino populations, often portrayed as criminals and associated with darker-skinned, Indigenous Latinos (Flores and Schachter 2018; Gómez Cervantes 2021; Herrera 2016). Through the racialization of "illegality" (García 2017; Menjívar 2021; Robertson and Roman 2024), these stereotypes extend to the broader group, and Whiteness represents a strategy to distance oneself from these stigmatized in-group members. These strategies may extend to other stigmatized in-group members, like Spanish monolinguals and immigrants in general, though certain kinds of immigrants (e.g., "legal" immigrants) are sometimes positively differentiated (García Bedolla 2005).

Afro-Latinos in the U.S. are doubly marginalized by their Blackness and Latinidad, often facing anti-Black racism from other Latinos (Hernández 2022). While past work tends to focus on Afro-Latino distancing from either Latinos or African Americans due to stigma (Roth 2012), I argue that many Afro-Latinos adopt strong Black identities linked to pro-Black policy orientations. These identities emerge in response to racialization and reflect an awareness of shared racial disadvantage; they are also congruous with strong Latino identities and pro-Latino policy orientations on issues like immigration. For Latinos who may not be consistently ascribed a Black identity by others, strong Black identities may encompass an awareness of racial discrimination on the basis of darker skin color and shared interests in addressing inequality.

This brings me to several hypotheses on the construction and politics of Black and White

[7]For example, a light-skinned, higher socioeconomic status Latino individual may be more likely to see Whiteness as attainable and important for their well-being even while identifying primarily as Latino. Nonetheless, while social acceptance as White for Latinos is dependent on factors such as skin color or socioeconomic status, it is broadly available as an identity choice given the historical institutional classification of Latinos as White.

identities for Latinos. First, I expect that stronger Black and White identities should correlate with several social and psychological factors beyond racial categorization by others. Given the historical construction of citizenship and implicit associations between Whiteness and being American (Devos and Banaji 2005), strong White identifiers should be more likely to hold stronger American identities. I expect White identities to correlate with Republican party ID and Black identities to correlate with Democratic party ID given race-party alignments (Westwood and Peterson 2022). Finally, in line with historical inequalities throughout the Americas, I expect that strong White identifiers will be of a higher socioeconomic status.

Next, I detail hypotheses on the relationship between Latino racial identities and attitudes on specific racialized issues and leaders. First, I expect that White identities should predict support for Trump, a figure who has explicitly vowed to protect Whiteness while disparaging undocumented immigrants. Although the White nationalism Trump enables denigrates Latinidad, his rhetoric and policies affirm many Latinos who seek to positively distinguish themselves from undesirable in-group members. Similarly, I expect White identities to align with dominant beliefs about Whiteness, such as the denial of White privilege or the belief that White people face discrimination. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: Latinos who more strongly identify as White will be more likely to support Trump and more likely to hold conservative attitudes on the nature of Whiteness.

Turning to immigration attitudes, I expect that Latinos who more strongly identify as White will hold attitudes that disparage and restrict the rights of undocumented immigrants in particular. This includes endorsing stereotypes about undocumented immigrant criminality, viewing them as detrimental to Latino progress, and supporting increased deportations and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). I expect this relationship to extend to attitudes on immigration in general (e.g., preferences for immigration levels), though to a lesser extent. This is because certain kinds of documented immigrants, such as highly skilled immigrants, are construed as hardworking, positive exemplars of the group compatible with upward racial mobility:

H2: Latinos who more strongly identify as White will be more likely to hold more con-

servative attitudes on undocumented immigration and, to a lesser extent, immigration in general.

Regarding Black identities, I expect that Latinos who more strongly identify as Black will be more likely to support policies that are perceived to improve the status of Black people. This may include policies racialized as Black issues even if they are not explicitly racial, such as welfare (Gilens 2000):

H3a: Latinos who more strongly identify as Black will be more likely to support policies implicitly or explicitly perceived to reduce anti-Black racism and inequality.

On the other hand, strong White identification should not predict opposition to Black-centered issues. Strong in-group identities do not necessarily lead to negative out-group attitudes (Brewer 1999), so strong White identities themselves should not be strongly related to attitudes on pro-Black policies (Jardina 2019):

H3b: Latinos who more strongly identify as White will not be more likely to oppose policies implicitly or explicitly perceived to reduce anti-Black racism and inequality.

Importantly, in the absence of a causal identification strategy, my theory does not suggest that racial identities necessarily cause political attitudes. It is equally plausible that a Latino individual first adopts political positions that denigrate undocumented immigrants and subsequently identifies as White. Racial identities – one's subjective attachments to racial categories – are not static even in adulthood (Davenport 2020). This opposite causal direction is compatible with the theory that racial identities are constructed through politics. While it is possible that some unobserved variable may be correlated with both racial identities and political attitudes, I adjust for several observed potential confounders using the controls detailed below.

Data and Methods

My empirical analysis draws upon two original surveys of Latino adults (N=1,488 and N=577) fielded in April 2024 and March 2026, respectively, through the Cint and CloudResearch Connect panel aggregators.[8] The samples approximate benchmarks from national demographics or

[8]I follow the Census in defining my population of interest as individuals who trace their ancestry or origin to Latin American countries and/or Spain. Respondents were kept in the

probability samples with respect to gender, household income, state of residence, and partisanship. The surveys were available in both English and Spanish, but they underrepresent foreign-born Latinos and non-English proficient Latinos. They also overrepresent college-educated Latinos and Latinos with a non-Latino parent. To account for this, I weight all regression analyses using entropy balancing by age, gender, region, education, and nativity to the Current Population Survey (Hainmueller 2012). Post-weighting distributions show that weights improve imbalances by education, immigrant generation, survey language, and having a non-Latino parent.

Measuring Black and White Identities among Latinos

Racial self-classification questions commonly modeled after the Census pose significant challenges in assessing Latinos' racial identities (Hitlin, Brown, and Elder 2007; Roth 2012). In addition to not accurately reflecting individuals' preferred racial labels or perceptions of racial group membership, they do not reveal the strength of one's racial attachment. Accordingly, I develop several distinct measures of racial identities for Latinos, which minimize the likelihood that results are driven by a specific item.

First, I adapt a three-item social identity scale (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015), assessing the centrality and accuracy of racial labels to one's identity. I focus on those respondents who self-classify as White (N=852, or 57% of the sample) and Black (N=146, or 10% of the sample) in a Census-style question, since the scale relies upon respondents' selected self-classifications; the questions also pipe in earlier stated panethnic label preferences (either Hispanic or Latino):

- "To what extent do you think of yourself as a [White; Black or Afro-] [Hispanic or Latino] person?" ("A great deal" to "Not at all")
- "How well does the term [White; Black or Afro-] [Hispanic or Latino] describe you?" ("Extremely well" to "Not at all")
- "How much would you say that [White; Black or Afro-] [Hispanic or Latino] people have

sample if they did not self-classify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish on a separate origin question but said they had at least one Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish grandparent. See Appendix A for more information on sampling, descriptive statistics, and attention checks.

in common with one another compared to other [Hispanic or Latino] people?" ("A great deal" to "Nothing at all")[9]

Although Latinos' selected racial self-classifications may not reflect their preferred racial labels, we should expect that individuals who, for example, select a White self-classification but do not internally see themselves as such should score low on the above scale. I rescale the three items between 0 and 1 and average them into one moderately consistent index (Cronbach's alpha of 0.71).

Second, to employ the full samples, I draw upon measures assessing closeness and linked fate with Black, Latino, and White people (Davenport, Iyengar, and Westwood 2022; McClain et al. 2009), which were asked of all respondents regardless of racial self-classification. These measures have long been used in political science to assess the strength of one's racial identification and group consciousness (Conover 1984; Miller et al. 1981):[10]

- Closeness: "How close do you feel toward the following groups? (Please respond on the scale below, where 1 means 'Not at all close' and 5 means 'Extremely close')."
- Linked Fate: "How well do the following statements describe your views? 'As things get better for [Black / White / Latino people] in general, things get better for me.'"

These questions assess racial attachments for Latinos who select other racial self-classifications, in particular "Some other race" self-classifiers. Since racial self-classifications are fluid for many Latinos (Liebler et al. 2017), they allow us to gauge attachments for respondents who, for example, may self-classify as White at one point in time but not another. More broadly, consistent with the theory, these measures capture subjective attachments to Blackness and Whiteness without requiring respondents to understand themselves as full or unambiguous members of either category. I include closeness and linked fate toward all three groups in models below to account for general feelings of group warmth (Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989) and instead

[9]In the second survey, I employ a modified scale that excludes panethnic labels such that the second question would read: "How well does the term [White / Black] describe you?"

[10]Notably, linked fate remains disputed as a measure of group consciousness, particularly when used beyond African Americans (McClain et al. 2009).

capture the extent to which respondents rate one group high or low *relative* to others.[11]

Racialized Political Attitudes

I construct several policy attitude indices to assess the hypotheses above. I assess attitudes toward Trump with a simple favorability item and attitudes on Whiteness through a three-item index encompassing attitudes toward White supremacists, White privilege, and discrimination against White people. General immigration policy attitudes are assessed through an index encompassing preferences for increasing immigration levels, providing a path to citizenship for undocumented adults who arrived in the U.S. as children, and reducing visa overstays.[12]

Attitudes toward undocumented Latino immigrants specifically are evaluated through three original items, the first two capturing discontent with negative stereotypes of undocumented immigrants spilling over to all Latinos and the third, conversely, capturing solidarity with undocumented immigrants: "Latinos who come to the U.S. illegally make it harder for all other Latinos," "Latinos who have crossed the border recently are getting involved in more crime than earlier waves of Latinos who immigrated legally," and "Latino citizens need to support and stand up for undocumented Latinos." The second survey included questions on undocumented immigration in general, including attitudes toward Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and increasing deportations. Finally, I assess Black-centered policy attitudes with items on welfare, affirmative action, and the death penalty, issues which are racialized as Black (Eberhardt et al. 2006; Gilens 2000).

[11]Difference measures that subtract, for example, White and Latino closeness, yield substantively similar results. However, I keep these as separate predictors because it more closely aligns with the theory that Latinos may identify with White, Black, or Latino identities to varying degrees. A difference measure would collapse individuals who see themselves as close to both Latinos and White people and those who see themselves as close to *neither* into the same category, thus masking potentially important variation.

[12]I include the second two items, although they are about undocumented immigration, because they evoke more positive representations of DACA recipients or higher status immigrants. Nevertheless, results are substantively the same using the single immigration levels item.

Estimation Strategy

Because this research is descriptive, I identify two primary analytic objectives: describing the magnitude of the relationship between racial identities and political attitudes and predicting political attitudes using racial identities. To this first end, I estimate regressions for each political attitude with OLS and compare the coefficients of Black and White identities with those for Latino identities. Complete results with and without a set of theoretically informed controls are displayed in the Appendix. To the second end, I employ random forests with variable importance measures to assess whether these identities contribute predictive information alongside Latino identities. This analysis thus serves as a descriptive test of critical assumptions in the literature that panethnicity is the primary ethnoracial identity orienting Latino political attitudes. Since OLS assumes a linear functional form and is susceptible to overfitting when many predictors are used, the random forests also ensure results are not driven by OLS assumptions (Montgomery and Olivella 2018).

Results

Before turning to the main results, I first examine the distributions of the distinct measures used. Figure 1 plots the distribution of average responses to the three items in the social identity index for White and Black self-classifiers. Both distributions are left-skewed, with a majority of respondents above the midpoint, suggesting that these identities are central ways in which Latinos understand their race. This is particularly true for Black self-classifiers, with a median value of 0.72 (compared to 0.64 for White self-classifiers).

Table 1, which presents the distribution of responses to the closeness and linked fate measures, reveals that respondents generally express the highest levels of closeness with Latinos, though substantial shares also see themselves as close to White and Black people. Levels of linked fate are lower across all groups, but the average difference between the groups is similar. On a respondent-level basis, 14.4 percent of respondents rated themselves closer to White people than Latinos, 37.0 percent rated themselves equally close to both groups, and 48.5 percent rated themselves closer to Latinos. Meanwhile, 7.8 percent rated themselves closer to Black people than Latinos, 38.5 percent rated both groups equally close, and 53.6 percent rated

Latinos closer; relative ratings are similar for linked fate.




Figure 1: Distribution of Racial Identity Index, Black and White Self-Classifiers. This figure presents the distributions of the three-item racial identity index for Black self-classifiers (N=146) on the left and White self-classifiers (N=852) on the right from Survey 1; dashed lines represent the median for each distribution. Distributions are unweighted.

Closeness	**Not at all close (1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**Extremely close (5)**	**Mean (0–1)**
Latino people	1.9	3.7	16.5	27.2	50.7	0.80
Black people	12.6	13.5	29.3	22.8	21.8	0.57
White people	8.1	10.5	29.5	27.0	25.0	0.63
Linked Fate	**Not at all**	**A little**	**Somewhat**	**Very well**	**Extremely well**	**Mean (0–1)**
Latinos	14.1	11.0	28.3	25.1	21.4	0.57
Black people	29.1	12.8	25.3	20.1	12.6	0.44
White people	30.5	12.4	25.3	17.2	14.6	0.43

Table 1: Distribution of closeness and linked fate responses. This table presents the distribution of closeness and linked fate with Latinos, Black people, and White people on the full sample of the first survey (N=1,488), as well as the scaled averages. Distributions are unweighted.

These findings are consistent with the theory that most Latinos strongly identify with panethnicity, while some simultaneously express strong attachments to Blackness and Whiteness. This pattern is further illustrated by Figure 2, which presents an alternative operationalization of these measures – the joint distribution of respondents who express both strong racial and Latino identities, a strong racial identity only, a strong Latino identity only, and neither; respondents were categorized as "high" if they lie above the midpoint of the scale. In line with

theoretical expectations, most strong Black and White identifiers among the White and Black self-classifier subsamples also express strong Latino identities. Smaller shares of self-classifiers – around 20 percent – express strong Black or White identities but weak Latino identities, and even fewer express weak Black or White and strong Latino identities.

Results for closeness and linked fate among the full sample reveal a similar pattern but with higher shares of respondents – namely those who self-classify as neither White nor Black – expressing only strong Latino closeness and linked fate. For linked fate, consistent with the more symmetric distribution where many respondents fall at the midpoint of the scale, pluralities of respondents express low linked fate with both racial and panethnic categories. This suggests that expressing linked fate represents a stronger form of attachment, in line with the conceptual idea that individuals tie their personal well-being to that of the group. These distributions may partly reflect general feelings of group warmth or distance, so analyses below include both measures in the same model. Nonetheless, these results reveal that – more often than not – strong Black and White identities coexist with strong panethnic identities.[13]




Figure 2: Joint Distributions of White-Latino and Black-Latino Identities. This figure presents the joint distributions of the three-item racial identity index, closeness, and linked fate with Latino identity, closeness, and linked fate, respectively, from the first survey (N=1,488). The identity index draws from the Black and White self-classifier subsamples (N=146 and N=852); bars are shaded for joint distributions with Black and White identities. Distributions are unweighted.

[13] Appendix B, which displays distributions for Survey 2, demonstrates similar variance but somewhat smaller shares of respondents expressing strong Black and White identities.

Which Latinos hold stronger Black and White attachments?

Next, I turn to examining the social and demographic correlates of Black and White attachments. Figure 3 presents OLS coefficients from models with the White and Black identity scale among self-classifiers as the outcomes.[14] First, I examine self-classification (among predictors of closeness and linked fate) and "street race," a proxy for racialization which asks respondents how someone on the street might perceive their race. Just over half (51 percent) of respondents stated others would perceive them to be Latino, whereas 29 percent said White, 5 percent said Black, and 12 percent stated mixed race.

Self-classification is a significant predictor of Black and White closeness and linked fate (Appendix C), which suggests that self-classifications do align with meaningful perceptions of group membership for some Latinos. Interestingly, however, street race is a significant predictor only for White attachments once accounting for self-classification. Because 75 percent of respondents who report being perceived as Black also self-classify as Black, self-classification may capture some of the same variation in Black attachments as external ascription.

Although street race is a significant predictor of White identities, there is substantial variation beyond this. Many respondents who report being perceived by others as White do not express strong White identities, and vice versa. Together, these findings suggest that many Latinos may be plausibly seen by others as White or Black, yet external ascription or perceived belonging to a category does not necessarily entail a strong attachment to it. The identity, closeness, and linked fate measures capture meaningful social psychological variation beyond self-classification or racial categorization by others.

Turning to other predictors, Latino and American identities are closely associated with Black and White identities. As mentioned earlier, this is likely in part due to general feelings of group warmth, particularly for linked fate measures. Yet this finding suggests that panethnic, racial, and American identities are not mutually exclusive and frequently overlap. Furthermore,

[14] I interpret the Black identity results with caution given the smaller sample size (N=146) and place greater confidence in results that align across the three measures. See Appendix C for results for the closeness and linked fate measures.




Figure 3: Correlates of Black and White Identities. This figure presents OLS coefficients with Black and White identities as the outcomes regressed on social and demographic predictors. All continuous variables are scaled from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate stronger Latino and American identities, more Republican party ID, more conservative ideology, higher SES, later generation, and older age; the remaining variables are binaries. For national origin, Mexican represents the baseline category. Results draw from subsamples of Black (N=146) and White (N=852) self-classifiers and use entropy weights matched to the 2024 Current Population Survey. Results for closeness and linked fate can be found in Appendix C.

American identity strength only predicts White (and not Black) closeness and linked fate, in line with the social construction of Americanness and citizenship (Devos and Banaji 2005).

Moving on to partisanship, we find some evidence that it aligns with Black and White identities, though it is not consistent across the measures. Black self-classifiers who are more Democratic are more likely to strongly identify as Black, whereas more Republican respondents report higher White closeness and linked fate (Appendix C). Ideology, on the other hand, is only a significant predictor for Black linked fate, suggesting that Black and White attachments cannot be reduced to conservative or liberal ideologies. Consistent with a substantial

body of work on socioeconomic inequality and racial identities, higher incomes tend to predict stronger White identities and closeness. Education, on the other hand, predicts stronger Black identities among self-classifiers, which may reflect heightened awareness around racial inequality (Davenport 2016).

Among the remaining demographic variables, there is limited evidence that strong Black and White identities are significantly correlated with immigrant generation, age, gender, or having a non-Latino parent. However, individuals who took the survey in Spanish (who are overwhelmingly likely to be first-generation and more recent immigrants) display stronger White identities and weaker Black identities. Given that recent immigrants are more likely to face stigma (García Bedolla 2005), this may reflect strategies to distance oneself from stigmatized identities. Finally, turning to national origin, Cubans and South Americans are most likely to adopt strong White identities across the measures (Gosin 2019). Interestingly, Dominicans are *less* likely to identify strongly as Black among Black self-classifiers. This may suggest distancing from Blackness among some (Roth 2012), though this is not the case for the Black closeness and linked fate measures (Appendix C).

Latinos' Racial Identities and Political Attitudes

I now turn to evaluating hypotheses on the relationship between Black and White identities and political attitudes. Figure 4 presents coefficients from OLS models regressing Trump favorability, attitudes on Whiteness, distinct immigration attitude indices, and Black-centered issue attitudes on the three measures of White, Black, and Latino attachments. The top two rows plot coefficients for White and Latino identities. The bottom row plots coefficients for Black and White identities in the left and right panels, with Black-centered issue attitudes as the outcome. The figure also plots coefficients for racial self-classification for closeness and linked fate regressions (since the identity scale already subsets to self-classifiers). Higher values for each outcome variable indicate more conservative attitudes.[15]

[15]Full OLS coefficients for models with and without controls can be found in Appendix D. Results from Survey 1 replicate on the second survey, but I include results from Survey 2 in the main text only for attitudes on Whiteness and undocumented immigration, since these were not queried on the first.




Figure 4: Relationship between White, Black, and Latino Identities and Racialized Political Attitudes. This figure presents the coefficients of OLS regressions with political attitudes as the outcomes and the identity index, closeness, linked fate, and self-classification as primary predictors from separate OLS regressions. The top two rows examine White identities, while the bottom row examines both Black and White identities in relation to Black-centered policy attitudes. All continuous variables are scaled from 0 to 1, and point estimates are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals. Results for Trump favorability, undocumented Latino attitudes, general immigration attitudes, and Black-centered issue attitudes draw from Survey 1 (N=1,488), while results for White attitudes and undocumented policy attitudes draw from Survey 2 (N=577). As before, the identity indices restrict the sample to White and Black self-classifiers, while closeness and linked fate draw from the full samples. Results employ entropy weights matched to the 2024 Current Population Survey.

Looking first at the panels on Trump favorability and attitudes on Whiteness, we find consistent evidence that White identities are related to favorable attitudes toward Trump across the three measures. Respondents who express the highest levels of White identities, closeness, and linked fate score 9 to 17 percentage points higher in Trump support compared to those with the lowest levels. The magnitudes of the White identity coefficients are comparable to those for Latino identity. Turning to attitudes on Whiteness (an index of attitudes on White privilege,

discrimination, and supremacists), we find even stronger support for a strong relationship with White identities. Coefficients range from 12 to 23 percentage points and are larger than the corresponding Latino identity coefficients, suggesting that White identities among Latinos align with worldviews that see Whiteness as under threat and reject White privilege.

Moving on to immigration, the theory predicts that Latinos who strongly identify as White will be more likely to hold negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants in particular, as their connection to negative stereotypes jeopardizes upward racial mobility. The next three panels evaluate the relationship between White identities and three indices regarding immigration: general immigration attitudes, attitudes on undocumented Latinos in particular, and attitudes on undocumented immigration. We find strong support for the theory. White identities are significantly predictive of beliefs that undocumented Latinos make it harder for all Latinos, are committing more crimes, and that Latinos who are citizens should not stand up for undocumented Latinos. As before, the coefficients are similar in magnitude to those for Latino identity.

These findings are not limited to attitudes toward undocumented Latinos; they also extend to attitudes on undocumented immigration more broadly in the second survey, including support for ICE and increasing deportations. The results for general immigration attitudes, however, reveal a much weaker relationship between White identities and attitudes on immigration levels, DACA recipients or DREAMers, and reducing visa overstays. White closeness and linked fate significantly predict support for more restrictive attitudes on these immigration policies, but the coefficients are smaller than the corresponding Latino identity coefficients, which consistently predict more inclusive immigration attitudes.[16] This suggests that immigration – when it elicits favorable representations of Latinidad – may not necessarily be seen as threatening to group mobility, an important qualification to the second hypothesis.

Turning to Black-centered issue attitudes in the bottom row, we find evidence that Black identities predict support for Black-centered policies, though White identities do not. Con-

[16]These results are similar using the single-item question gauging preferences on immigration levels.

sistent with expectations, Black identities among Latinos predict more liberal attitudes on welfare spending, affirmative action, and the death penalty. Among Black or Afro-Latino self-classifiers, respondents who express the highest levels of Black identity have more liberal Black-centered issue attitudes by 24 percentage points compared to those with the lowest levels of identity. Among the full sample, Black closeness and linked fate predict increased support for Black-centered issues by around 12 to 14 percentage points of the full scale. These coefficients are larger than the corresponding Latino identity coefficients and lend additional support to the theory that Afro-Latinos – particularly strong identifiers – possess uniquely pro-Black political orientations.

Finally, looking at the bottom right panel, we find uniform support for the notion that stronger White identities do not entail more anti-Black policy attitudes. In line with work on non-Latino White people (Jardina 2019), the coefficients for Black-centered issues are all very close to zero. These findings suggest that Latinos who more strongly see themselves as White may not necessarily view issues around anti-Black racism or inequality as threatening to their identities or status, in contrast to findings by Filindra and Kolbe (2022). Conversely, strong Latino identities are indeed significantly linked with pro-Black policy orientations.

Notably, once accounting for racial attachments, Black and White self-classifications themselves are not significant predictors of political attitudes. The coefficient on self-classification for almost every model is substantively small and not statistically significant. While recalling the earlier finding that Black and White self-classifiers hold stronger Black and White identities on average, this result suggests that it is one's racial attachments beyond simply perceiving oneself as part of a group that are politically consequential. I test this formally in Appendix Figure E1, which displays the coefficients for White and Black self-classification binaries as primary predictors of main policy indices but excluding measures of racial attachments, along with the same set of social and demographic controls. With the exception of Black-centered issues, the coefficients on racial self-classifications are near zero. These findings caution against using racial self-classifications as measures of Black and White attachments among Latinos, as they may not accurately reflect the personal significance of these identities.

Random Forest Results: The Predictive Importance of Black and White Identities

To ensure that the results are not driven by the assumptions of OLS and are applicable to prediction problems, I turn to variable importance measures from random forests. Figure 5 displays parallel results from random forest regressions using permutation variable importance measures (Wei, Lu, and Song 2015). Rather than display the magnitude of the relationship between identities and political attitudes, these analyses discern which variables contribute the most predictive information in explaining the political attitude outcomes. The x-axes display the decrease in mean-squared error, a measure of the predictive information provided by the given identity variable when it is randomly shuffled versus held at its existing values. I include national origin – commonly understood as one of the most salient divisions within the broader panethnic category – for comparison.

The random forests yield substantively similar conclusions. Measures of White identities are a stronger predictor of Trump favorability, attitudes on Whiteness, and undocumented Latino attitudes, relative to both Latino identities and national origin. Random forest results diverge for attitudes on ICE and deportations – for which Latino attachments are a stronger predictor on two of the three measures – though the White identity scale remains strongest. Consistent with OLS results, White identities are a weaker predictor of attitudes on immigration levels, DACA, and visa overstays; in fact, the variable importance measure is below zero for the identity scale and closeness, which indicates it is less helpful to prediction than random values.

The random forest results for Black-centered issue attitudes are also consistent with the OLS results. White identities are generally weak predictors of attitudes on welfare, affirmative action, and the death penalty, whereas Black closeness and linked fate are the strongest predictors. The one exception is the comparatively weak predictive importance of Black identity among the Black self-classifier subsample. This may reflect restricted variation – because Black self-classifiers tend to report stronger Black identities and more liberal attitudes on these issues, Black identity provides less information for distinguishing attitudes within this group. Overall, these results lend additional credence to the importance of Black and White identities




Figure 5: Importance of Racial and Panethnic Identities in Predicting Political Attitudes, Random Forests. This figure presents parallel results to Figure 4 with permutation variable importance measures from random forest regressions. Within each panel, the x-axis displays the decrease in mean-squared error explained by White, Black, or Latino identities using the permutation variable importance. This figure is parallel to Figure 4; see Figure 4 notes for samples and weights.

alongside Latino identities in explaining variation in Latino political attitudes. Interestingly, national origin differences – such as being Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rican – appear to explain little variation in attitudes on these issues, since the variable importance measures are close to or below zero across the board.

Robustness Checks

In Appendix E, I conduct two additional analyses to ensure that the results are robust to alternative measurement approaches and to assess whether they are specific to racialized policy attitudes. First, I replicate the primary analyses using the joint measure of racial and panethnic identities from Figure 2, which distinguishes respondents who are high and low on White,

Black, and Latino identities. Results yield substantively similar conclusions. Respondents with strong White identities – regardless of whether their Latino identities are strong or weak – report more favorable attitudes toward Trump and less favorable attitudes toward undocumented immigrants than do respondents with strong Latino identities but weak White identities (Appendix Figure E2).

Second, to ensure that the measures of identity are not merely capturing a conservative worldview or orientation, I regress an index of abortion and climate change attitudes on racial identities (Appendix Table E1). With a few exceptions, Black and White identities, closeness, and linked fate are not significantly related to abortion and climate attitudes. By contrast, Latino closeness and linked fate emerged as consistent predictors of these attitudes, which implies that Latino identity may be capturing a broader liberal ideological disposition. Along with the inconsistent correlation between attachments and the seven-point ideology scale, these results support the measures' validity, as Black and White identities should be unrelated to policies that do not implicate racial boundaries or stigma.

Discussion and Conclusion

Latinos in the U.S. have faced a history of oppression in the form of violence and segregation dating back to the Mexican-American War. While scholarship in Latino politics has rightfully attended to this legacy of racialization in understanding panethnic mobilization and political behavior, in doing so it has overlooked the fact that not all Latinos relate to Blackness and Whiteness equally. Like the U.S., Latin American countries are structured by similar racial caste systems, and Latinos have historically negotiated their racial position in the U.S. through Whiteness and Blackness. In this project, I have attempted to fill this gap by interrogating how Latinos' relationships to Whiteness and Blackness can help us comprehend intragroup divides on contemporary policy issues. Synthesizing sociological work on the construction of race across the Americas with the historical literature on Latino politics, I trace how these identities reflect longstanding tensions within Latino communities in the United States. They represent commitments to distinct racial projects, either aligning with dominant Whiteness or contesting anti-Blackness.

Employing novel measures of racial attachments among Latinos, I show that many Latinos see Black and White identities as important to their sense of self and well-being. These measures also demonstrate that many Latinos express shared feelings, closeness, and interests with Black and White people even when their membership in these categories is conditional. Strong White attachments predict Trump support and unfavorable attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, a pattern I interpret as distancing from the most stigmatized subgroup members. Black attachments, meanwhile, predict liberal attitudes toward welfare and affirmative action, issues historically associated with African Americans. These identities often predict political attitudes more strongly than Latino identities, underscoring the need to look beyond panethnicity or national origin-based accounts of Latino political behavior. The findings build upon a large literature in sociology demonstrating the limits of racial self-classifications, offering new ways of assessing the personal significance of race beyond panethnicity for Latinos (Dowling 2015; Hitlin et al. 2007; Roth 2016).

My approach centers contested ethnoracial boundaries in the study of racial identities and political behavior. Individuals do not simply accept racial boundaries but rather actively dispute and reinterpret them. Many Latinos adopt strong White identities – seeing themselves akin to White people and sharing similar worldviews – despite not always being accepted as such (Abascal 2020). This conflict between self-identification and dominant group ascription is key to understanding why some Latinos distance themselves from undocumented immigrants and align themselves with Whiteness. High degrees of race-mixing and historically blurry boundaries make claims to Whiteness plausible (but not guaranteed) for some, and Latinos may be expanding the set of phenotypes understood to be White. Whereas past research often takes a singular, fixed racial identity as the starting point for explaining political behavior, the current work demonstrates that racial identities are not mutually exclusive and themselves negotiated through politics.

While past work has tended to focus on Afro-Latinos who eschew Black identities as a form of upward racial mobility (Roth 2012; Waters 1999), the findings here suggest that most Afro-Latino self-classifiers do indeed adopt strong Black identities and pro-Black policy orientations. As with White identities, these claims are not uncontroversial. Historically, hypode-

scent implied a more inclusive conception of Blackness, but Black self-identification claims today are not policed much differently from White claims (Abascal et al. 2025). This suggests that some mixed-race Latinos may not be accepted as Black, like in Brazil, where Blackness is more narrowly defined (Davenport 2020). Changing norms around hypodescent may explain why some Latinos express strong Black closeness or linked fate when others do not recognize them as Black. Future work would do well to explore the extent to which Black closeness and pro-Black solidarity among such Latinos reflect perceptions of shared racial disadvantage with Black people or darker skin tone (Jones 2022; Wilkinson and Earle 2013).

More broadly, the measures I employ here represent a conceptual advance in assessing racial and ethnic identities when boundaries are blurry and membership in racial categories may be contextual. This idea – that individuals may possess multiple, overlapping racial identities or attachments – may shed light on the politics of other groups for whom boundaries are not fixed. For example, closeness and linked fate to different groups could be used to understand the preferences of multiracial individuals – who similarly navigate multiple racial attachments – on racialized issues (Davenport et al. 2022). Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) individuals, who blur administrative boundaries of Whiteness and encompass wide phenotypic variation like Latinos, merit further attention. As racial boundaries become more fluid and intermarriages increase (Davenport 2020; Duncan and Trejo 2011), employing careful measures of racial attachments that do not treat racial group memberships as mutually exclusive or fixed will become indispensable.

Although the current research is descriptive, future work should examine the social processes underlying White and Black identities among Latinos with survey experiments or quasi-experimental approaches. For example, can a treatment linking Latinos to negative stereotypes of undocumented immigrants increase White identification? Or does White self-classification increase with real-world changes in media coverage of undocumented immigrants? Measures of Black and White identities can be used as moderators in experiments assessing the differential effects of stigma and political rhetoric. How might Latinos who are racialized by others as Black respond to a treatment making salient the stigmatization of Blackness – do weak Black identifiers hold more anti-Black attitudes as a result?

As the opening example illustrates, Latino racial identities are not merely Black or White. Future research would do well to explore the politics of Indigeneity or multiraciality. For example, what does it mean for Latinos to identify as multiracial – does this reflect beliefs in *mestizaje* (racial mixture), or does it indicate consciousness of a certain racialization and progressive racial attitudes (Davenport 2016)? Likewise, some Latinos are themselves Indigenous or the children of Indigenous Latino immigrants, belonging to groups such as the Zapotec in Mexico. Future research should explore potential points of unity or contestation with respect to Indigenous identities – for example, the extent to which Latinos may be accepted as Indigenous in the U.S. and whether they see themselves in solidarity with non-Latino Indigenous people. Anti-Indigenous attitudes, and how they may be connected to intragroup divisions on issues like immigration, merit deeper analysis.

Although the current work centers Blackness and Whiteness among Latinos, much work remains to be done to understand the normative implications of racial politics among Latinos. Previous scholars have pointed to inherent tensions within panethnic and racial movements, which often ignore or actively harm the most marginalized members (Beltrán 2010; Cohen 1999). Panethnic activism continues to play an important role in contesting racial hierarchies, yet activist movements must recognize that not all Latinos share the same views of racial inequality and the most stigmatized in-group members. In fact, organizing around panethnicity may sometimes impede equity for Black, Indigenous, and undocumented Latinos. Future work should continue to grapple with the complexity of Latino identities and attitudes on the path to overcoming ethnoracial inequality.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Additional Sampling Information

A1: Ethics and Consent. The study was reviewed by the University's IRB and deemed exempt. Respondents in the first survey were compensated by the panel provider, Cint. Respondents in the second survey were compensated $3.00 for their participation. Respondents consented at the beginning of the survey. Though deception was not used, respondents were debriefed on the goals of the study at the end.

A2: Sampling Latinos. In defining Hispanic or Latino in the U.S., I narrowly refer to people with origins in Brazil or the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America (alongside Spain). While Latino technically includes Romance language-speaking countries such as Haiti or French Guiana, I exclude these because individuals from these countries largely do not understand themselves (or are understood by others) to be Hispanic or Latino. While lay understandings of Hispanic or Latino people in the U.S. do not generally encompass Spaniards or Spanish Americans – hence the term Latino – I keep respondents who identify their national origin as solely Spanish or Spaniard to ensure the inclusion of many *nuevomexicanos* and other Latino individuals whose families have resided in the Southwest since before the Mexican-American War and who may identify primarily as Spanish or Hispanic. For many Latinos, identifying as Spanish may also serve as a strategy to distance oneself from the stigmatization of Latinidad (Salgado 2020) and thus reflect important population-level variation.

As stated in the main text, respondents were kept in the sample if they did not self-classify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish on a separate origin question but said they had at least one Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish grandparent. In practice, only 1-2 percent of the samples did not self-classify as Latino but disclosed Latino ancestry. This is likely an underestimate of attrition due to constraints of the panel providers. Cint and CloudResearch populated the surveys from their pool of panelists who at one point self-classified as Hispanic or Latino. In order to fully account for attriters, invitations to the survey would have to be sent out to panelists of all ethnoracial backgrounds and subsequently remove respondents who do not self-report Hispanic or Latino ancestry. However, as survey vendors base their rates on having a high enough

incidence rate – e.g., keeping a certain percentage of respondents who are forwarded to the survey – this would be very costly. Because attriters are likely to express stronger Black or White identities, the results here may be taken as a lower bound on the strength of White and Black identities among Latinos.

A3: Attention checks and response quality. Respondents who failed either of two initial attention checks were not recruited into the study. Post-screening attention checks indicate that most respondents remained attentive throughout the surveys. On the first survey, 74.9 percent of respondents passed both of the post-screening attention checks, and 96.2 percent passed at least one of the two. On the second survey, only a handful of respondents failed either post-screening attention check. Respondents who failed post-screening attention checks do not appear to be speeding or giving unusual answers, and failing post-screening attention checks is correlated with lower levels of formal education, as prior work has found (Alvarez et al. 2019).

A4: Missingness. Following IRB guidelines, respondents were prompted once to answer questions they left blank but ultimately allowed to move on without answering them. There were very low levels of missingness on both surveys, except for income (11 percent) and Trump support (2 percent) on the first survey. I diverge from the preregistration plan (which specified listwise deletion would be used) and instead impute non-structurally missing data using random forests, to avoid discarding observations unnecessarily.

A5: Descriptive statistics. The table below displays descriptive characteristics for the surveys. As noted in the main text, the samples are representative along lines of gender, age, state of residence, and party ID. The samples overrepresent college-educated individuals, later generation individuals (Moslimani and Noe-Bustamante 2023), and Latinos with one parent that is not Hispanic or Latino (Lopez, Krogstad, and Passel 2024). However, employing entropy weights to the 2024 CPS ameliorates these imbalances.


A6: Preregistrations. The preregistrations can be found at the following links: https://osf.io/74tvr/overview?view_only=974d6730005f4687ae398ea88fab3b95 and https://osf.io/39syg/overview?view_only=0af88dde0c8d4340b7587ddd6e5330ab.

	Survey 1 (Before Weighting)	Survey 1 (After Weighting)	Survey 2 (Before Weighting)	Survey 2 (After Weighting)	Benchmark
Median Age	40	41	33	41	41
Median Household Income	$50k–75k	$25k–50k	$50k–75k	$50k–75k	$71k
% Women	54.4	51.1	51.0	50.2	51.4
% CA, TX, NY, FL	55.3	58.0	59.3	55.1	58.2
% Mexican	50.8	46.4	53.2	41.5	61.6
% in Spanish	9.0	20.8	0.7	5.1	—
% 1st Gen	18.1	49.5	12.3	50.7	42.0
% 3rd+ Gen	44.0	28.4	30.8	18.3	24.0
% 2 Latino Parents	70.6	78.4	62.2	66.4	85.0
% Citizens	91.9	78.2	97.2	89.1	79.0
% Bachelor's+	34.3	20.7	43.5	20.7	21.0
% Democrat	51.6	48.8	59.4	51.4	57.5

Table A5: Descriptive Characteristics.

Appendix B: Distributions of Racial Identities, Survey 2

B1: Distribution of White Identity Index, Survey 2



This figure presents the distribution of the White identity index for White self-classifiers on Survey 2 (N=303). This figure is a companion to Figure 1.

B2: Distribution of Closeness and Linked Fate, Survey 2

Closeness	**Not at all close (1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**Extremely close (5)**	**Mean (0–1)**
Latino people	2.4	3.5	19.2	30.5	44.4	0.78
Black people	16.5	16.6	32.8	24.1	10.0	0.49
White people	12.0	18.0	36.6	21.1	12.3	0.51
Linked Fate	**Not at all**	**A little**	**Somewhat**	**Very well**	**Extremely well**	**Mean (0–1)**
Latinos	8.1	14.9	31.0	27.0	18.9	0.58
Black people	24.8	17.7	28.1	17.7	11.8	0.44
White people	33.8	26.2	25.8	9.4	4.9	0.31

This table presents the distributions of White, Black, and Latino closeness and linked fate on Survey 2 (N=577). This table is a companion to Table 1.

Appendix C: Predicting Black and White Closeness and Linked Fate

Figure C1: Predictors of Black and White Closeness. This figure is a companion to Figure 3, displaying OLS coefficients with Black and White closeness as the outcomes regressed on primary social and psychological predictors. All continuous variables are scaled from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate a later generation, higher SES, older age, higher Latino closeness, stronger American identity, and more Republican party ID. The remaining variables are binaries, except for national origin, which is a categorical variable with "Mexican" as the baseline. Results draw from the full survey 1 sample (N=1,488) and use entropy weights matched to the 2024 Current Population Survey.





Figure C2: Predictors of Black and White Linked Fate. This figure is a companion to Figure 3, displaying OLS coefficients with Black and White linked fate as the outcomes regressed on primary social and psychological predictors. All continuous variables are scaled from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate a later generation, higher SES, older age, higher Latino linked fate, stronger American identity, and more Republican party ID. The remaining variables are binaries, except for national origin, which is a categorical variable with "Mexican" as the baseline. Results draw from the full survey 1 sample (N=1,488) and use entropy weights matched to the 2024 Current Population Survey.



Appendix D: Main OLS Results, Without Controls and With Full Controls Displayed

Table D1: OLS results with no controls and full controls, White identity and Trump favorability. This table displays OLS results with Trump favorability as the DV and White identity, closeness, and linked fate as primary predictors, from which the Trump favorability panel of Figure 4 is derived.

Dependent Variable:	Trump Favorability					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Intercept	0.35*	-0.05	0.40*	-0.04	0.40*	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
White Identity	0.10	0.09*				
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
Latino Identity		-0.16*				
		(0.04)				
White Closeness			0.26*	0.17*		
			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Latino Closeness			-0.18*	-0.10*		
			(0.04)	(0.03)		
Black Closeness				-0.04		
				(0.03)		
White Linked Fate					0.30*	0.14*
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Latino Linked Fate					-0.22*	-0.08*
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Black Linked Fate						-0.06*
						(0.03)
White Self-Class				-0.01		-0.01
				(0.02)		(0.02)
American Identity		0.18*		0.16*		0.17*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Party ID		0.51*		0.48*		0.48*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ideology		0.27*		0.25*		0.24*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Man		0.00		0.04*		0.04*
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Education		0.00		-0.02		-0.02
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Income		0.05		0.09*		0.09*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Generation		0.04		0.06*		0.05*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Citizen		0.01		-0.04		-0.04
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
2 Latino Parents		0.10*		0.07*		0.06*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
In Spanish		0.07*		0.06*		0.05*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Age		-0.30*		-0.31*		-0.28*
		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Puerto Rican		0.03		0.06*		0.06*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Cuban		0.06		0.05		0.06*
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Spanish		0.02		0.01		0.02
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Dominican		0.15*		0.12*		0.09*
		(0.07)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Central American		-0.01		0.05		0.05
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
South American		-0.01		0.04		0.03
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Fit statistics						
Observations	852	852	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
R^2	0.00	0.51	0.05	0.45	0.07	0.44
Adjusted R^2	0.00	0.50	0.05	0.44	0.07	0.43

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Table D2: OLS results with no controls and full controls, White identity and attitudes on Whiteness. This table displays OLS results with attitudes on White privilege, discrimination, and supremacists as the DV and White identity, closeness, and linked fate as primary predictors, from which the Whiteness attitudes panel of Figure 4 is derived.

Dependent Variable:	Whiteness Attitudes					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Intercept	0.12*	0.14*	0.39*	0.15*	0.37*	0.22*
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.04)
White Identity	0.37*	0.20*				
	(0.05)	(0.05)				
Latino Identity		-0.09*				
		(0.04)				
White Closeness			0.14*	0.12*		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Latino Closeness			-0.28*	-0.07*		
			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Black Closeness				-0.06*		
				(0.02)		
White Linked Fate					0.26*	0.23*
					(0.03)	(0.02)
Latino Linked Fate					-0.38*	-0.12*
					(0.02)	(0.03)
Black Linked Fate						-0.13*
						(0.03)
White Self-Class				-0.02		-0.03*
				(0.01)		(0.01)
American Identity		0.04		0.06*		0.05*
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Party ID		0.01		0.19*		0.16*
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Ideology		0.37*		0.19*		0.16*
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Man		0.08*		0.05*		0.03*
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Education		-0.13*		-0.07*		-0.03
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Income		-0.06		0.07*		0.05*
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Generation		-0.03		-0.01		0.00
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Citizen		0.05		0.00		-0.04
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
2 Latino Parents		-0.04		-0.04*		-0.03
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.01)
In Spanish		-0.22*		-0.10*		-0.13*
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Age		-0.09*		-0.06*		-0.06*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Puerto Rican		-0.10*		-0.11*		-0.05*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Cuban		-0.03		-0.03		-0.02
		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Spanish		0.03		0.04		0.04
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)
Dominican		0.06		0.03		0.03
		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Central American		0.05		-0.03		-0.03
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
South American		0.05		0.01		-0.01
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Fit statistics						
Observations	303	303	577	577	577	577
R^2	0.15	0.62	0.18	0.52	0.30	0.58
Adjusted R^2	0.15	0.59	0.18	0.51	0.30	0.57

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Table D3: OLS results with no controls and full controls, White identity and immigration policy attitudes. This table displays OLS results with general immigration policy attitudes as the DV and White identity, closeness, and linked fate as primary predictors, from which the general immigration attitudes panel of Figure 4 is derived.

Dependent Variable:	Immigration Attitudes					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Intercept	0.44*	0.19*	0.53*	0.26*	0.53*	0.26*
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
White Identity	0.05	0.05				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Latino Identity		-0.13*				
		(0.03)				
White Closeness			0.11*	0.04*		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Latino Closeness			-0.16*	-0.09*		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Black Closeness				-0.06*		
				(0.02)		
White Linked Fate					0.11*	0.07*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Latino Linked Fate					-0.19*	-0.09*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Black Linked Fate						-0.07*
						(0.02)
White Self-Class				-0.01		-0.01
				(0.01)		(0.01)
American Identity		0.06*		0.04*		0.04*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Party ID		0.11*		0.09*		0.09*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ideology		0.15*		0.17*		0.15*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Man		0.04*		0.02*		0.02*
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Education		0.01		-0.01		0.00
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Income		0.01		0.05*		0.04
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Generation		0.05*		0.03*		0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Citizen		0.07*		0.02		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
2 Latino Parents		0.03		0.02		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)
In Spanish		0.05*		0.01		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Age		0.09*		0.13*		0.12*
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Puerto Rican		0.03		0.04*		0.04*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Cuban		0.04		0.05*		0.04*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Spanish		0.02		0.02		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Dominican		0.07		0.04		0.02
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Central American		0.07*		0.03		0.03
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
South American		0.05*		0.06*		0.05*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Fit statistics						
Observations	852	852	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
R^2	0.00	0.25	0.05	0.21	0.07	0.22
Adjusted R^2	0.00	0.24	0.05	0.20	0.07	0.21

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Table D4: OLS results with no controls and full controls, White identity and undocumented Latino immigrant attitudes. This table displays OLS results with undocumented Latino immigrant attitudes as the DV and White identity, closeness, and linked fate as primary predictors, from which the undocumented Latino attitudes panel of Figure 4 is derived.

Dependent Variable:	Undocumented Latino Immigrant Attitudes					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Intercept	0.42*	0.09	0.55*	0.14*	0.54*	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)
White Identity	0.12*	0.12*				
	(0.04)	(0.04)				
Latino Identity		-0.16*				
		(0.03)				
White Closeness			0.23*	0.14*		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Latino Closeness			-0.26*	-0.15*		
			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Black Closeness				-0.08*		
				(0.02)		
White Linked Fate					0.22*	0.16*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Latino Linked Fate					-0.27*	-0.11*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Black Linked Fate						-0.09*
						(0.02)
White Self-Class				-0.02		-0.02
				(0.01)		(0.01)
American Identity		0.16*		0.11*		0.12*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Party ID		0.18*		0.16*		0.16*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ideology		0.20*		0.22*		0.19*
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Man		-0.03		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Education		0.04		0.02		0.03
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Income		0.07		0.07*		0.06*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Generation		0.04		0.01		0.01
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Citizen		0.00		0.05*		0.05*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
2 Latino Parents		0.04		0.03*		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
In Spanish		-0.06*		-0.03		-0.04*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Age		0.12*		0.09*		0.11*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Puerto Rican		0.09*		0.10*		0.10*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Cuban		0.07*		0.08*		0.07*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Spanish		0.04		0.09*		0.09*
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Dominican		0.20*		0.23*		0.20*
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Central American		0.07*		0.09*		0.09*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
South American		0.12*		0.15*		0.15*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Fit statistics						
Observations	852	852	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
R^2	0.01	0.33	0.10	0.32	0.09	0.32
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.32	0.10	0.31	0.09	0.31

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Table D5: OLS results with no controls and full controls, White identity and undocumented immigration attitudes. This table displays OLS results with undocumented immigration attitudes as the DV and White identity, closeness, and linked fate as primary predictors, from which the undocumented immigration attitudes panel of Figure 4 is derived.

Dependent Variable:	Undocumented Immigration Attitudes					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Intercept	0.05	-0.27*	0.67*	0.05	0.60*	-0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)
White Identity	0.77*	0.16*				
	(0.09)	(0.06)				
Latino Identity		-0.11*				
		(0.04)				
White Closeness			0.26*	0.06*		
			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Latino Closeness			-0.64*	-0.25*		
			(0.04)	(0.03)		
Black Closeness				-0.11*		
				(0.03)		
White Linked Fate					0.12*	0.10*
					(0.04)	(0.03)
Latino Linked Fate					-0.61*	-0.06
					(0.04)	(0.04)
Black Linked Fate						-0.11*
						(0.03)
White Self-Class				-0.02		-0.01
				(0.01)		(0.02)
American Identity		0.06		0.04		0.06*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Party ID		0.29*		0.35*		0.36*
		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.04)
Ideology		0.42*		0.28*		0.31*
		(0.07)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Man		0.01		0.01		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Education		0.03		0.01		0.02
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Income		0.05		0.03		0.00
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Generation		0.03		0.03		0.05*
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Citizen		0.13*		0.09*		0.05
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
2 Latino Parents		0.03		0.04*		0.03
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
In Spanish		-0.08		-0.02		-0.08*
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.04)
Age		0.10*		0.12*		0.12*
		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Puerto Rican		0.09*		0.05*		0.11*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Cuban		0.04		0.05		0.05
		(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Spanish		0.00		-0.06		-0.01
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Dominican		0.22*		0.11*		0.10*
		(0.07)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Central American		-0.10*		0.01		0.03
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.03)
South American		0.07		0.06*		0.04
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Fit statistics						
Observations	303	303	577	577	577	577
R^2	0.20	0.84	0.34	0.78	0.32	0.74
Adjusted R^2	0.20	0.83	0.34	0.77	0.32	0.73

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Table D6: OLS results with no controls and full controls, Black identity and Black-centered policy attitudes. This table displays OLS results with Black-centered policy attitudes as the DV and Black identity, closeness, and linked fate as primary predictors, from which the Black issues (for Black Identity) panel of Figure 4 is derived.

Dependent Variable:	Black-centered Policy Attitudes					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Intercept	0.55*	0.47*	0.65*	0.43*	0.60*	0.44*
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Black Identity	-0.20*	-0.24*				
	(0.06)	(0.09)				
Latino Identity		0.06				
		(0.06)				
Black Closeness			-0.11*	-0.12*		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Latino Closeness			-0.14*	-0.06*		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
White Closeness				0.02		
				(0.02)		
Black Linked Fate					-0.16*	-0.14*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Latino Linked Fate					-0.10*	-0.07*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
White Linked Fate						0.01
						(0.02)
Black Self-Class				-0.02		-0.01
				(0.02)		(0.02)
American Identity		0.08		0.03		0.04*
		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Party ID		-0.01		0.09*		0.09*
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ideology		0.22*		0.18*		0.15*
		(0.06)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Man		0.01		0.00		0.00
		(0.03)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Education		-0.17*		-0.05*		-0.04
		(0.07)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Income		0.17*		0.12*		0.10*
		(0.06)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Generation		-0.06		-0.02		-0.03
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Citizen		0.07		0.03*		0.04*
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
2 Latino Parents		-0.04		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.03)		(0.01)		(0.01)
In Spanish		0.02		-0.09*		-0.09*
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Age		-0.10		0.03		-0.02
		(0.09)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Puerto Rican		-0.03		-0.02		-0.03
		(0.04)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Cuban		-0.02		0.01		-0.01
		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Spanish		-0.09		0.02		0.01
		(0.14)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Dominican		-0.06		0.02		0.00
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Central American		-0.19*		-0.05*		-0.05*
		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.02)
South American		-0.02		0.00		0.00
		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Fit statistics						
Observations	146	146	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
R^2	0.06	0.39	0.06	0.23	0.12	0.26
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.30	0.06	0.22	0.12	0.25

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Table D7: OLS results with no controls and full controls, White identity and Black-centered policy attitudes. This table displays OLS results with Black-centered policy attitudes as the DV and White identity, closeness, and linked fate as primary predictors, from which the Black issues (for White Identity) panel of Figure 4 is derived.

Dependent Variable:	Black-centered Policy Attitudes					
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
Intercept	0.53*	0.43*	0.59*	0.42*	0.58*	0.43*
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
White Identity	-0.05	0.01				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Latino Identity		-0.23*				
		(0.03)				
White Closeness			0.05*	0.02		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Latino Closeness			-0.18*	-0.06*		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Black Closeness				-0.12*		
				(0.02)		
White Linked Fate					0.02	0.01
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Latino Linked Fate					-0.21*	-0.07*
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Black Linked Fate						-0.14*
						(0.02)
White Self-Class				0.02		0.02
				(0.01)		(0.01)
American Identity		0.12*		0.03		0.04*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Party ID		0.07*		0.08*		0.09*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ideology		0.15*		0.19*		0.15*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Man		-0.02		0.00		0.00
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
Education		-0.03		-0.05*		-0.04
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Income		0.08*		0.12*		0.10*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Generation		-0.01		-0.03		-0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Citizen		0.04		0.03*		0.04*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
2 Latino Parents		0.03		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)
In Spanish		-0.07*		-0.09*		-0.09*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Age		-0.03		0.03		-0.02
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Puerto Rican		-0.01		-0.02		-0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Cuban		0.00		0.00		-0.01
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Spanish		0.01		0.02		0.01
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Dominican		0.02		0.01		0.00
		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Central American		0.00		-0.05*		-0.05*
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)
South American		0.00		0.00		0.00
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Fit statistics						
Observations	852	852	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
R^2	0.00	0.26	0.04	0.23	0.08	0.26
Adjusted R^2	0.00	0.24	0.04	0.22	0.08	0.25

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Appendix E: Robustness Checks with Joint Measure and Climate and Abortion Attitudes

Figure E1: Relationship between Racial Self-Classifications and Political Attitudes. This figure presents the coefficients of OLS regressions with White or Black self-classifications as the primary predictors of the same political attitude outcomes. The first five coefficients examine White self-classification, while the last two examine Black and White self-classifications for the Black-centered policy index. Results employ entropy weights matched to the 2024 Current Population Survey.




Figure E2: Relationship between Joint Measure of Racial and Panethnic Identities and Racialized Political Attitudes. This figure presents the coefficients of OLS regressions with political attitudes as the outcomes and the joint measure of racial and panethnic identities as the primary predictor. The top two rows examine White identities, while the bottom row examines both Black and White identities in relation to Black-centered policy attitudes. The baseline category encompasses respondents with strong Latino identities and weak Black or White identities. Within each panel, the coefficients for identity, closeness, and linked fate draw from separate OLS regressions. All outcome variables are scaled from 0 to 1, and point estimates are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals. Results for Trump favorability, undocumented Latino attitudes, general immigration attitudes, and Black-centered issue attitudes draw from Survey 1 (N=1,488), while results for White attitudes and undocumented policy attitudes draw from Survey 2 (N=577). As before, the identity indices restrict the sample to White and Black self-classifiers, while closeness and linked fate draw from the full samples. Results employ entropy weights matched to the 2024 Current Population Survey.




Table E1: Robustness Check with Climate and Abortion Attitudes. This Appendix table presents OLS results for a robustness check with an index of climate change and abortion attitudes as the dependent variable (higher is more conservative). The first column subsets to White self-classifiers (N=852), the second to Black self-classifiers (N=146), and the third and fourth use the full sample for Survey 1. The last three columns examine Survey 2, with column 5 examining White self-classifiers (N=303).

Dependent Variable:	Climate and Abortion Attitude Index						
Model:	(White ID)	(Black ID)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Variables							
Intercept	0.21*	0.47*	0.24*	0.22*	0.02	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Racial Identity	-0.05	-0.41*			-0.09		
	(0.04)	(0.12)			(0.07)		
Latino Identity	-0.16*	-0.04			-0.31*		
	(0.03)	(0.09)			(0.05)		
White Closeness			-0.03			0.01	
			(0.03)			(0.03)	
Black Closeness			-0.02			-0.09*	
			(0.02)			(0.03)	
Latino Closeness			-0.15*			-0.14*	
			(0.03)			(0.04)	
White Linked Fate				0.04			0.03
				(0.02)			(0.04)
Black Linked Fate				-0.03			0.00
				(0.03)			(0.04)
Latino Linked Fate				-0.18*			-0.21*
				(0.03)			(0.05)
White Self-Class			-0.01	-0.02		0.04*	0.05*
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.02)	(0.02)
American Identity	-0.09*	0.20*	-0.04	-0.04	0.12*	0.04	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party ID	0.23*	0.01	0.21*	0.21*	0.12	0.18*	0.16*
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ideology	0.32*	0.12	0.28*	0.25*	0.64*	0.55*	0.55*
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Man	0.03	-0.04	0.05*	0.05*	-0.01	0.06*	0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.06	0.12	-0.06*	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Income	-0.05	-0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.07*	-0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Generation	-0.02	-0.11	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Citizen	0.06*	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.12*	0.02	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)
2 Latino Parents	0.05*	0.02	0.03	0.04*	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
In Spanish	-0.02	0.17	0.04	0.03	-0.11	-0.06	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.16*	-0.30*	0.11*	0.06	0.06	0.19*	0.13*
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Catholic	0.02	-0.06	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Puerto Rican	-0.07*	0.01	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.09*	0.00	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cuban	-0.12*	-0.08	-0.13*	-0.14*	0.03	0.06	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Spanish	-0.07*	-0.13	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Dominican	-0.07	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.13	0.13*	0.14*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Central American	0.00	0.08	0.03	0.03	-0.04	0.11*	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
South American	-0.01	0.11	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Fit statistics							
Observations	852	146	1,488	1,488	303	577	577
R^2	0.35	0.31	0.24	0.26	0.82	0.69	0.69
Adjusted R^2	0.33	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.81	0.68	0.68

IID standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: *: 0.05*

Appendix References

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